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Ab stract
Van Fraassen has re cently ar gued that em pir i cism can be con strued as a
stance, in volv ing com mit ments, at ti tudes, val ues, and goals, in ad di tion to
be liefs and opin ions. But this char ac teri sa tion emerges from his rec og ni tion
that to be an em pir i cist can not be to be lieve, or de cide to com mit to be lief in,
a foun da tional prop o si tion, with out re mov ing any ba sis for a non-dog matic
em pir i cist cri tique of other philo soph i cal ap proaches, such as ma te ri al ism.
How ever, no tice able by its ab sence in Van Fraassen's dis cus sions is any
men tion of Bartley's ‘pancritical ra tio nal ism’, for Bartley of fers a co he sive
ar gu ment that gen u ine dog ma tism lies pre cisely in the act of com mit ment to
an idea. The con se quence of de ny ing this, he thinks, is an open ing of the
flood gates to irrationalism: if to rely on rea soned ar gu ment in de ci sion-mak -
ing is fun da men tally an act of faith, then there is a tu quoque – “I sim ply
have a dif fer ent faith” – that may be em ployed by those who wish to shield
their views from crit i cism.
This raises the fol low ing ques tion: why should it be any less dog matic to
adopt par tic u lar com mit ments, at ti tudes, val ues, and goals, rather than a par -
tic u lar be lief or opin ion, come what may? And if Bartley is right that there is
only one non-dog matic at ti tude – the crit i cal at ti tude – then why might this
not be adopted by an em pir i cist, a ma te ri al ist, a meta phy si cian, or any one
else?
1. Introduction
The Em pir i cal Stance has con sid er able scope, yet it clearly builds upon Van Fraassen's 
ear lier work, in par tic u lar The Sci en tific Im age. Its cen tral ques tion is clear: ‘What is
em pir i cism, and what could it be?’ (Van Fraassen, 2002:xiii). And while some of the
tac tics that Van Fraassen em ploys in or der to an swer this should be fa mil iar by now –
for ex am ple, he main tains the view that ex plan a tory power should only be con strued
as a prag matic vir tue for the o ries, that the only forms of pos si bil ity and ne ces sity are
ver bal, and that there is a rad i cal dis tinc tion be tween ac cep tance and be lief – his over -
all strat egy has de vel oped con sid er ably. Most no tice ably, he now has meta phys ics
firmly in his sights, whereas be fore hand, he has only hinted at such an tip a thy.2
1 I am grate ful to E.J.Lowe, Sa rah Aiston, au di ences at the Uni ver sity of Dur ham and the PSSA Con fer -
ence 2005, and two of the jour nal's anon y mous ref er ees, for their com ments on ear lier ver sions of this
piece. I am par tic u larly grate ful to Otávio Bueno for a pro longed, and ex tremely en light en ing, ex change 
on The Em pir i cal Stance.
2 See the in tro duc tion to Van Fraassen (1980), where it is im plied that Ar is to te lian phi los o phy in hib ited
prog ress in the Mid dle Ages, and that there is strong sim i lar ity be tween the rea sons for which nomi nal -
Early on, Van Fraassen re casts em pir i cism as a ‘stance’ in re sponse to prob lems that 
he iden ti fies with clas si cal un der stand ings of em pir i cism. Yet he goes on to sug gest it
might be com pared with other al leged stances, in par tic u lar ‘The Ma te ri al ist Stance’,
and found to be su pe rior. So on the ba sis of a per func tory read ing, it might be thought
that ‘stances’ are do ing rather a lot of work: not only do they pro vide the ba sis for a
more ro bust form of em pir i cism, but also a metaphilosophical ap pa ra tus for de bates
be tween empiricists and non-empiricists. The sus pi cion that this is sim ply ‘too good to 
be true’, for the em pir i cist, might then arise.
But would this be right? What I should like to de ter mine in this pa per is not only the 
ac tual role that ‘stance’ plays in Van Fraassen's ar gu ments, but also what role it ought
to play, if any. In or der to de ter mine the for mer, which I at tempt first, I adopt a char i -
ta ble ap proach, and sug gest that the an te ced ent char ac teri sa tion is quite un fair. How -
ever, I then con tinue by sug gest ing that ‘stance’ ought not to have an im por tant role to
play ei ther in de fend ing em pir i cism, or in en abling an em pir i cist cri tique of meta phys -
ics (or ma te ri al ism). To il lus trate this, I of fer a novel char ac teri sa tion of ‘stance’,
through which it emerges that Van Fraassen's ar gu ments are only ef fec tive against par -
tic u lar forms of meta phys ics (and ma te ri al ism), which share sim i lar com po nents. In
clos ing, I for mu late an em pir i cism that is ac tu ally less dog matic than Van Fraassen's
‘Em pir i cal Stance’, but which sub or di nates em pir i cism to Bartley's ‘pancritical ra tio -
nal ism’ . I there fore urge that it is re ally the lat ter that does the im por tant work, and
that all empiricists ought to be pancritical ra tio nal ists, if they are to avoid bas ing their
po si tions on faith alone.
2. The Invocation of ‘Stance’ 
In at tempt ing to es tab lish what em pir i cism might be, Van Fraassen first con sid ers it as
a his tor i cal move ment, and draws the con clu sion that it is char ac ter ised by ‘a re cur rent 
re bel lion against the meta phy si cians’ (Van Fraassen, 2002:36). How ever, since this is
one of the points at is sue herein, it can not bode well for us to ac cept this, as it stands.
In stead, this claim might be mod er ated some what, and we might ac cept, pend ing fur -
ther in ves ti ga tion, that em pir i cism is at least char ac ter ised by its op po si tion to cer tain
forms of meta phys ics.
More re veal ing and co gent, how ever, is his sub se quent anal y sis of what em pir i cism
can not be. For he ar gues that the em pir i cist can not en gage in a cri tique of meta phys ics 
– or for our pur poses, any form of meta phys ics – if she ac cepts a ‘Prin ci ple Zero’ such 
that (Van Fraassen, 2002:41):
For each philo soph i cal po si tion X there ex ists a state ment X+ such that to have
(or take) po si tion X is to be lieve (or de cide to be lieve) that X+.
Why? Be cause to hold that there is a fac tual the sis that is not only im mune to em pir i -
cist crit i cism, but is also the foun da tion of the em pir i cist's at tack on meta phys ics, is
prob lem atic; this, for it might be open to meta phys i cal crit i cism.3 And al though the
em pir i cist might con fess to hav ing made a leap of faith, the meta phy si cian with an op -
pos ing foun da tional claim might con fess to the same, and a stale mate would en sue.
The price of shield ing one's po si tion from crit i cism on the ba sis of an ap peal to faith is 
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ists op pose meta phys i cal re al ism, and those for which empiricists op pose sci en tific re al ism. See also the 
open ing chap ters of Van Fraassen (1989), and Van Fraassen (1991).
3 Along re lated lines, Ew ing (1951:ch.2) ar gues that 'the prop o si tion that there can be no syn thetic a pri -
ori prop o si tions would it self, if jus ti fied, have to be a syn thetic a pri ori prop o si tion ...’ 
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that one al lows oth ers to shield their po si tions on pre cisely the same ba sis. In the
words of Bartley (1962:103-104):
In sum, the be lief that ra tio nal ity is ul ti mately lim ited, by pro vid ing an ex cuse
for ir ra tio nal com mit ment, en ables a Protestant, or any other irrationalist, to
make an ir ra tio nal com mit ment with out los ing in tel lec tual in teg rity. But at the
same time, any one who makes use of this ex cuse may not, in in teg rity, crit i cize
the holder of a dif fer ent com mit ment. One gains the right to be ir ra tio nal at the
ex pense of los ing the right to crit i cize. One gains im mu nity from crit i cism for
one's own com mit ment by mak ing any crit i cism of com mit ments im pos si ble ...
More over if ev ery one has to be a sub jec tiv ist, there is a sort of con so la tion: no -
body can look in from the out side. Ev ery one is alone, in side his own mir ror
cage, star ing at his own face. No won der the existentialists are bored ... The
fact re mains that any one who is bored of be ing bored must an swer the tu
quoque.
So how might we view a philo soph i cal po si tion if ‘Prin ci ple Zero’ is vi o lated? The an -
swer: as a ‘stance’, which in volves be liefs and opin ions, but also ‘in volves a great deal 
more, will not be iden ti fi able through the be liefs in volved, and can per sist through
changes of be lief’ (Van Fraassen, 2002:62). And this knits nicely with Van Fraassen's
sug ges tion that the his tory of ideas plays an im por tant role in giv ing us an ori en ta tion:
‘In ev ery cen tury we must re in ter pret our selves to our selves. We do not come into our
cen tury with a ta bula rasa’ (xvii). It is also clear, even from his brief ini tial dis cus sion,
that while any ‘stance’ is sup posed to be rad i cally de pend ent on value- judge ments and 
at ti tudes, ‘to ward life, love, and laugh ter’ (62), it is also sup posed to be pos si ble to
com pare ‘stances’ on a prin ci pled intersubjective ba sis. For ex am ple, in com par ing the 
‘stance’ of ma te ri al ism with that of em pir i cism, Van Fraassen thinks it is il lu mi nat ing
to ex am ine how pro po nents of each approach (em pir i cal) sci ence.
Thank fully, there is a wealth of re cent ma te rial avail able in or der to in form the ex -
plo ra tion of ‘stance’, which I will re turn to later. But here, in fo cus ing on the rea son
for which Van Fraassen in tro duces the no tion, I want to con cen trate on the al leged sig -
nif i cance of Prin ci ple Zero. For as Teller (2004:160-162) points out – and un wit tingly
fol lows Bartley in so do ing – it would seem that Van Fraassen's ar gu ment is not suf fi -
cient to sug gest that there ought not to be any X+ to the X of a po si tion, but rather
that:
[T]here can be no such prop o si tion that is held or main tained in a cer tain way,
held as a “the sis” ... [S]omeone be lieves a state ment as a the sis if they also be -
lieve, or ex pect, or even just hope that, in the con text un der con sid er ation, the
state ment is sus cep ti ble to ra tio nal sup port of the kind that makes it uniquely
de fen si ble as op posed to its con trar ies ... The “sus cep ti ble to ra tio nal sup port”
may be only “in prin ci ple”, may be hope lessly out of prac ti cal reach.
Teller's sug ges tion is clearly that it might be per fectly ac cept able to be lieve in what -
ever foun da tional prop o si tion(s) one wishes – is sues con cern ing synchronic co her ence 
aside – pro vided one is not at tached to them in a po ten tially epistemically un wise (or
even flatly self-de cep tive) sense. That is, a sense which I shall endeavour to ex pli cate
fur ther in my dis cus sion of Pop per's ‘crit i cal at ti tude’, and Bartley's ‘pancritical ra tio -
nal ism’, later in the pa per. I will also urge that Teller's men tion of ‘the con text un der
con sid er ation’ is of par a mount im port, be cause if one is to be a non-dog matic em pir i -
cist, then one must be re cep tive to tran scen dent, as well as im ma nent, crit i cism of
one's em pir i cism. In other words, that there is a sense in which an em pir i cist is obliged 
to be will ing to be dis suaded from em pir i cism, by some one who dis agrees on the very
stan dard of what is ad mis si ble (or per mis si ble) in a crit i cal dis cus sion.
So I will con tend that Rorty (2002) is ab so lutely right to ask, in his re view of The
Em pir i cal Stance: ‘Is there a dif fer ence that makes a dif fer ence be tween as sum ing a
stance and ac quir ing a set of be liefs, ex cept per haps for what Peirce called “a cer tain
con trite fallibilism”?’ Not, as we shall see, be cause there is no dif fer ence: Van Fraas -
sen has some clear ideas about what is, and is not, in volved in tak ing a stance. But
rather be cause it is plau si ble that there would seem to be no dif fer ence that makes a
dif fer ence to the pros pects of em pir i cism. It is only in so far as ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’ 
is sup posed to in volve a deep fallibilism, and thus a de riv a tive will ing ness to be
open-minded, that it ought to be in voked by Van Fraassen, with re spect to his ul ti mate
end: to achieve an em pir i cism that is not self-re fut ing, in the fash ion that he takes
naïve em pir i cism, or what Lipton (2004) and Teller (2004) call ‘doc trine em pir i cism’,
to be.
In fact, in ac cept ing that ‘Prin ci ple Zero’ ought to be aban doned only in the sense
that none of us should just com mit our selves to, rather than merely be con vinced of,
the truth of par tic u lar prop o si tions, it does not fol low that we need in voke the no tion
of ‘stance’ . En ter the ‘crit i cal at ti tude’ pro moted by Pop per, of which Rorty's men tion 
of Peirce is rather sug ges tive (Free man and Skolimowski 1974:515):
Like Peirce, Pop per also on oc ca sion la bels his phi los o phy “fallibilism.” But a
much hap pier des ig na tion for iden ti fy ing the meth od ol ogy of both Peirce and
Pop per is found in Pop per's in spired phrase, “con jec tures and ref u ta tions,”
which co mes much closer to cap tur ing the es sence of Sci en tific Method.4
Be fore con tin u ing in this vein, how ever, there is a press ing is sue to which we should
re turn: ‘meta phys ics’ for Van Fraassen. We need also to un der stand what pre cisely he
takes him self to be ar gu ing against, and what the ar gu ments are that he em ploys, be -
fore we can de ter mine whether these also have, or ought to be thought to have, any re -
la tion ship to his in vo ca tion of ‘stance’ .
3. The Argument Against ‘Metaphysics’ 
In or der to un der stand Van Fraassen's ar gu ment against ‘meta phys ics’, we first need to 
un der stand what he takes ‘meta phys ics’ to re fer to. He in veighs against, var i ously, ‘a
sev en teenth-cen tury style of meta phys ics’ (Van Fraassen, 2002:4), ‘[Quinean] an a lytic 
on tol ogy’ (11), and ‘ma te ri al ism’ (49-61). But hid den away in a foot note is a more
sub stan tive def i ni tion of that which he op poses (231):
The type of meta phys ics to which I re fer, and which I take to be the en ter prise
en gaged in by, for ex am ple, Des cartes and Leibniz, is char ac ter ized by the at -
tempted con struc tion of a the ory of the world, of the same form as a fun da men -
tal sci ence and con tin u ous with (as ex ten sion or foun da tion of) the nat u ral sci -
ences.
Yet this is still rather vague. And Van Fraassen's state ment in the in tro duc tion, ‘I do
not re ject all meta phys ics’ (xvii), might seem cu ri ous, given his ap par ent as so ci a tion
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2005, 24(3) 203
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in tro duc tion to Pop per (1983), and sec tion 5 of this pa per.
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of ‘meta phys ics’ with ‘triv ial pur suits’ (30) at the end of chap ter one, and thence forth.
On the one hand, his point might be un der stood as this: many ac tiv i ties that in volve
‘puz zle-solv ing’ (in some thing like Kuhn's sense) are triv ial, but we need not re ject
them; all meta phys ics is ‘word play’, but need not be avoided as long as it is not ac -
com pa nied by ‘false con scious ness’ (e.g. the be lief that it is dis clos ing some spe cial
knowl edge about the ac tual). On the other, it might be thought that he owes us an ex -
pli ca tion of what sort of meta phys ics can be mean ing ful, and use ful, ac cord ing to one
who has an ‘Em pir i cal Stance’. Be sides the rec og ni tion that Van Fraassen is op posed
to philo soph i cal ap proaches that are too re spect ful of the con tent of nat u ral sci ence,
rather than its meth od ol ogy, we are at an im passe. Needs must we look be yond The
Em pir i cal Stance, to not only his sub se quent, but also his an te ced ent, work.
In his ear lier schol ar ship, how ever, Van Fraassen of fers a char ac teri sa tion of em pir i -
cism that seems far re moved from his pres ent one (Van Fraassen 1989:8): ‘By em pir i -
cism I mean the philo soph i cal po si tion that ex pe ri ence is our source of in for ma tion
about the world, and our only source.’ For here, of course, we have a sub stan tive the -
sis – an X+ to the X of em pir i cism, if ‘Prin ci ple Zero’ holds – with which many a
meta phy si cian, re al ist or ide al ist, would want to strongly dis agree. Now we are told
that this is wrong – or char ac ter ises a naïve form of em pir i cism – and that the sit u a tion 
is far less clear. Ei ther one is sup posed to be able to adopt an ‘Em pir i cal Stance’ with -
out be liev ing (or per haps even hav ing the opin ion) that ‘Ex pe ri ence is our source of
in for ma tion about the world, and our only source’, or with out hold ing it as a ‘the sis’ in 
Teller's sense, ex plained be fore hand. Hence, the pos si bil ity of there be ing meta phy si -
cians who are also empiricists, or empiricists who are pro-meta phys ics, would not
seem to be pre cluded. For in stance, it is un clear whether the po si tion of Lowe in volves 
(or could in volve) an ‘Em pir i cal Stance’ (Lowe, 1998:22-23):
[M]etaphysics by it self can only tell us what is meta phys i cally pos si ble, not
which of var i ous al ter na tive meta phys i cal pos si bil i ties ac tu ally ob tains ... the
con clu sions of meta phys i cal ar gu ments will of ten have the form of con di tional
state ments, which are them selves shown by such ar gu ments to be un con di tion -
ally true. For in stance, such a con clu sion might be that if time is real, then some 
per sist ing sub stance must ex ist. The fact that meta phys ics of ten de liv ers con -
clu sions of this form in no way con flicts with the claim that the pri mary ob ject
of meta phys ics is to es tab lish the meta phys i cal pos si bil ity of var i ous states of
af fairs and that it does not, in gen eral, tell us by it self that such-and-such a state 
of af fairs ac tu ally ob tains ... How, then, are we to form ra tio nal judge ments as
to which of var i ous meta phys i cally pos si ble al ter na tives do ac tu ally ob tain? In
a word: by ex pe ri ence. Know ing how the world could be in re spect of its fun -
da men tal struc ture, we must judge as best we can how it is by de ter min ing how
well our ex pe ri ence can be ac com mo dated with this or that meta phys i cal pos si -
bil ity as re gards that struc ture. This may ap pear to give meta phys i cal the o riz ing 
a sta tus sim i lar to that of sci en tific the o riz ing, but the sim i lar ity is only su per fi -
cial. A judge ment that the world ac tu ally ex hib its a given meta phys i cal fea ture
– for in stance, that it con tains sub stances or that time is real – will in deed be an
a pos te ri ori judge ment, be ing re spon sive to the ev i dence of ex pe ri ence. But the
con tent of the judge ment still re tains its modal char ac ter as ex press ing a gen u -
ine meta phys i cal pos si bil ity, al beit one judged now to be ac tu al ised.
Lowe's po si tion is par tic u larly in ter est ing to con trast with Van Fraassen's, since
where as the for mer is founded on (a be lief in) deep de re mo dal ity – on the no tion that 
there are broadly log i cal, in ad di tion to nar rowly and strictly log i cal, ne ces si ties – the
lat ter would seem to in volve (a be lief in) the dic tum that all ne ces sity is (merely) ver -
bal (Van Fraassen 1977). In fact, Van Fraassen (2004b:186) draws our at ten tion to ‘a
pro found sense – typ i cal of the em pir i cist tra di tion – of ut ter con tin gency in na ture ...
that finds ex pres sion in ... re jec tion of any and all ra tio nal ist grop ing for nat u ral ne ces -
si ties (let alone in for ma tive a pri ori truths).’  Yet, while the scope of mo dal ity is an ex -
tremely in ter est ing is sue, it re mains un clear that it ought to have such a great episte -
mological im pact. For in stance, pre sum ably to be a con struc tive em pir i cist is to be an
em pir i cist, and might – al though it need not – in volve tak ing the Em pir i cal Stance. Yet 
by the ad mis sion of Monton and Van Fraassen (2003:406): ‘[it] is cer tainly much eas -
ier for a modal re al ist to be a con struc tive em pir i cist than any one else’ . Hence, it is
some what of a mys tery how Van Fraassen (2004b:186) can claim ‘Cer tainly the con -
tent of a par tic u lar em pir i cist's philo soph i cal stance must be pre cisely what char ac ter -
izes his/her po si tion. Thus it must en tail the rel e vant be liefs (for ex am ple, that there
are no laws of na ture)’, since this would mean that there could be con struc tive
empiricists who are not empiricists, in vir tue sim ply of their be liev ing in laws of na -
ture.
One sus pects that this prob lem arises be cause too much bur den is be ing placed upon 
poor lit tle ‘em pir i cism’ – in ad di tion, I will ar gue, to un lucky ‘meta phys ics’ – and be -
cause we are never di rectly told what it is sup posed to be. It is char ac ter ised, but in a
dis jointed fash ion that is li a ble to lead to in con sis ten cies, or at least rea son able con fu -
sion, such as that ex plained above. It is dif fi cult to see the wood for the trees. And
since ac cord ing to Lowe's ac count, ex pe ri ence is ex tremely im por tant as a source of
knowl edge – in deed, the ul ti mate pur pose of meta phys i cal theo ris ing is to en able us to
get at how the world ac tu ally is, via ex pe ri ence – we might be for given for think ing
that there is a gen u ine sense in which it is that of an em pir i cist.5 That is, un less be ing
‘anti-meta phys ics’ is nec es sary in or der to be an em pir i cist, which is surely a the sis
that is quite dis put able, if it is not to beg the ques tion, given that ‘em pir i cism’ has an
ac tual his tory. To put the point plainly: if Van Fraassen can dis so ci ate him self from
his tor i cally sig nif i cant as pects of ‘em pir i cism’ such as associationism (and the af fil i -
ated be lief in sense im pres sions) and yet re main an ‘em pir i cist’, then why can one not
dis so ci ate one self from its ‘anti-meta phys ics’, and yet re main an ‘em pir i cist’ ? As we
shall see, this ques tion be comes even more press ing when it is ad mit ted that to be an
em pir i cist is not merely to adopt a par tic u lar set of be liefs, opin ions, or prop o si tional
at ti tudes. It is not just a ver bal quib ble, but a gen u ine dis pute about what is at the heart 
of ‘em pir i cism’: about the ex tent to which it in volves a deep re spect for, and in volve -
ment with, sen sory ex pe ri ence (and/or its ob jects, con strued per haps as the
fainovmeno", in Empiricus' sense).6 (That is, as op posed to a re jec tion of the pos si bil ity 
of, or any value what so ever in, non-sen sory ex pe ri ence.) No tice, here, the guarded
lan guage I use: how I in ti mate that we might be able to ad mire sen sory ex pe ri ence, in -
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2005, 24(3) 205
5 In fact, his view is not only per fectly con sis tent with, but also sug ges tive of, a claim such as: ‘Ex pe ri -
ence is our most im por tant source of in for ma tion about the (ac tual) world.’  
6 Needs must I skirt around the is sue of the o ries of per cep tion, but I agree with Ladyman (2000) that Van
Fraassen seems to be a di rect re al ist. On this note, it is worth not ing that Lowe (1981) fa vours (a form
of) in di rect re al ism; in this re spect, then, he is ar gu ably closer to be ing an ‘em pir i cist’ , his tor i cally
speak ing, than Van Fraassen.
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deed revel in it, and thereby en gage with the world in a dif fer ent fash ion to those who
do not, with out need ing to com mit, in any sense, to the truth of a par tic u lar prop o si -
tion, or prop o si tions. This is im por tant since Van Fraassen (2004b: 173) wants to have 
it, with re spect to doc trines such as ‘Ex pe ri ence is our source of in for ma tion about the
world, and our only source’, that: ‘[T]he com mit ment [to em pir i cism] is not based on
that be lief; in stead there is a kind of prag matic in co her ence in hav ing such a com mit -
ment while de ny ing or ex press ing dis be lief or doubt with re spect to that state ment.’ I
will con fess that I find the no tion of ‘prag matic in co her ence’ a lit tle dif fi cult to grasp – 
prag ma tism seems to be as sumed as a back ground here, where per haps it ought not to
be – but take the point to be along the fol low ing lines. Even if some one de nies that
doc trine, they might nev er the less be an em pir i cist, and en gage with the world as an
em pir i cist; the de nial of said doc trine would then be in co her ent only in so far as they
would be fail ing to re cog nise their im plicit sym pa thy to it, but not the ra tio nal ne ces -
sity of their com mit ting to be lief in it. This could be through self-de cep tion, inter alia.
But back to ‘meta phys ics’ for Van Fraassen, and let us first look to his Laws and
Sym me try, and sec ond to his Quan tum Me chan ics: An Em pir i cist View, be fore mov ing 
on to his re cent ar ti cles. In the for mer, we find the claim that ‘the end of the eigh teenth 
cen tury marks a great turn ing-point in phi los o phy’ (Van Fraassen 1989:8), which in -
volved a de sire, on the part of empiricists, to sep a rate sci ence from not only the ol ogy,
but also ‘meta phys ics’ . Van Fraassen is highly du bi ous that ‘rea son can bring us to
log i cal ... cer tainty of truths that tran scend ex pe ri ence’ (8). And more over, we find a
clue as to what form of meta phys ics may be ac cept able to him. One that bears sur face
sim i lar ity to the Kantian con cep tion, in so far as it only al lows for (9):
[T]he crit i cal ar chae ol ogy of ideas to un cover the ac tual pre sup po si tions in ac -
tual his tory of sci ence, plus the anal y sis of pos si ble pre sup po si tions that could
con sti tute a foun da tion for sci ence.
In the lat ter, we find a fur ther de vel op ment of this po si tion, whereby Van Fraassen ex -
presses his dis like for sci ent ism, ac cord ing to which sci ence ‘is el e vated (?) to the sta -
tus of meta phys ics’ (Van Fraassen 1991:17). Pre dict ably, the point seems to be that
ob ses sion with the con tent of con tem po rary sci ence, if that con tent is taken to dis close
the truth or ap prox i mate truth about the ‘way the world is’ (viz. what is ac tu ally the
case), is in ad vis able: as such, his ar gu ments against sci en tific re al ism and meta phys ics 
of a cer tain sort do seem to come to gether. But no tice that be ing in ter ested in the con -
tent of sci ence in an other way is per fectly per mis si ble (Van Fraassen 1991:4):
When we come to a spe cific the ory, the ques tion: how could the world pos si bly
be the way this the ory says it is? con cerns the con tent alone. This is the foun da -
tional ques tion par ex cel lence, and it makes equal sense to the re al ist and em -
pir i cist alike.
Now this is a strik ing state ment, be cause Van Fraassen clearly wants to have it that it
is per fectly rea son able to be in ter ested in, and even care fully ex am ine, the con tent of
con tem po rary sci ence. What is wrong is to be an epistemic re al ist in the mould of
those that march un der the flag of ‘sci en tific re al ism’ ; as Psillos (1999:xix) puts it, to
re gard ‘ma ture and pre dic tively suc cess ful sci en tific the o ries as well-con firmed and
ap prox i mately true of the world.’ Yet Van Fraassen does not tell us that a meta phy si -
cian need be a sci en tific re al ist, pre sum ably be cause this is not the case! As such, it
seems strange that the ob jec tion to the use of ab duc tion with re spect to the non-ob -
serv able is still the pri mary line that van Fraassen em ploys in or der to ad dress ‘the
meta phy si cian', in The Em pir i cal Stance.
He asks (Van Fraassen, 2002:16), ‘Where is the meta phy si cian who shows us how
likely it is that in fer ence to the best ex pla na tion in on tol ogy will lead to true con clu -
sions?’ But all one need say in re ply is, “Where is the em pir i cist who shows us how
likely it is that in fer ence to the best ex pla na tion with re spect to ap pear ances will lead
to true con clu sions about fu ture (or po ten tial past) ap pear ances?” (And if there is no
ne ces sity in na ture, then why should there be any in sen sory ex pe ri ence, or with re -
spect to the in ter ac tion of the ob jects thereof?) It re mains un clear that ab duc tion is vi -
tal for meta phys ics, or in deed for any thing else, and if Van Fraassen's ‘anti-meta phys i -
cal’ po si tion re lies on the idea that meta phys ics is (or par tic u lar forms thereof are) im -
pos si ble with out ab duc tion, then he owes us an ar gu ment that he does not seem to
have yet pro vided. Af ter all, to make a de mand for ex pla na tion, and then to out line
pos si ble ex pla na tions, is not to se lect one of those ex pla na tions on the ba sis that it is
‘best’ . Fur ther more, the sub se quent choice to se lect one that is ‘best’ could very well
be a purely prag matic move, rather than a truth-con du cive one, in sci ence as well as in
meta phys ics. From ‘p is the best ex pla na tion of q’, and ‘q’, ‘p is true’ or ‘p is prob a bly 
true’ might not fol low. But from ‘p is the only ex pla na tion of q’, and ‘q’, ‘p is true’
would seem to. This, for the lat ter case would seem to in volve p ↔ q, q, rather than
just p → q, q, as pre mises. Hav ing said this, it must none the less be noted that ac cord -
ing to Van Fraassen (2004a:128), em pir i cist cri tiques of meta phys ics in volve ‘a re jec -
tion of de mands for ex pla na tion at cer tain cru cial points’. So a com plete re sponse to
his charge, which is surely based on his ear lier ac count of ex pla na tion (Van Fraassen
1980:ch.5), is still out stand ing.
This will have to wait un til an other time, though, since Van Fraassen has an other
cri tique of meta phys ics that de mands at ten tion. Spe cif i cally, this is that: ‘[T]he in ter -
pre ta tion of a the ory tar gets how na ture is rep re sented in that the ory, while the meta -
phy si cian tar gets (or pur ports to tar get) the na ture that the the ory rep re sents.’ (Van
Fraassen, 2004b:180). Now to this it must be said, first, that if we could only ever ‘tar -
get’ how na ture is rep re sented, as op posed to na ture (or as pects thereof), then we
could never get started in in quiry. This, since any ‘rep re sen ta tion’ would surely have
to be a part of re al ity – in a non-spe cial ist sense of ‘re al ity’ – in or der for it to serve as
a tar get! Sec ond, that in so far as there is an im plicit sug ges tion, here, that a sci en tist
can some how tar get na ture, whereas a meta phy si cian can not (with out re ly ing on sci -
ence), this seems im plau si ble. In par tic u lar, even if Van Fraassen is cor rect that it is
only via at tempts to con struct em pir i cally ad e quate the o ries that we can en gage with
na ture – ef fec tively, that we only in ter act di rectly with observables, or the ob serv able
part of na ture, from an epistemic per spec tive – then meta phys i cal in quiry with re spect
to that do main would still seem not only pos si ble, but also po ten tially use ful. Along
these lines, Ladyman (2004:135) sug gests, ‘Meta phys i cal the o ries are con nected with
ex pe ri ence, al beit more ten u ously than con crete re al is tic in ter pre ta tions of bits of sci -
ence.’ Yet I do not think he goes far enough, in so far as there are clear ex am ples of
meta phys i cal is sues that are just about as ‘con nected with ex pe ri ence’ as one can get.
Con sider the ques tion of why a glass does not be come part of a ta ble when it is placed
upon it, as a nail might when it is ham mered in to strengthen a weak en ing joint. Or the 
prob lem of whether it is re ally my watch that is be ing re turned to me, when the watch -
maker has re moved its orig i nal hour hand and re placed it with an other.
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The point is that it would be a bad pre sup po si tion that meta phy si cians need only, or
must only, look to sci ence (or the spe cial sci ences). In fact, even if meta phys ics were
nei ther a foun da tion, nor an ex ten sion, of sci ence, it need not fol low that it would
there fore be val ue less, or even of less value than sci ence. From a prac ti cal per spec tive, 
it is true that we would not have tele vi sion sets with out sci ence. (And it is such con sid -
er ations that mo ti vate prag ma tists to value sci ence so highly.) But it would be a mis -
take to con flate tech no log i cal de vel op ments with the sci en tific ac tiv ity that serves to
par tially en able them. No where in phys ics, or chem is try, or any other spe cial sci ence,
is there a the ory about how to make tele vi sion sets, or even a com plete list of in struc -
tions for do ing so. And if any thing, we are re peat edly re minded of the in suf fi ciency of
even our most ad vanced the o ries, taken alone, when it co mes to solv ing prac ti cal prob -
lems. The sum to tal of phys ics does not tell us how to make a com fort able shoe us ing
only sim ple (e.g. Ro man) tools, let alone how to con struct a fighter jet us ing all the
mod ern re sources at our dis posal. So it re mains un clear that meta phys ics – or at least
meta phys i cal as sump tions – are not re quired in such ex tra-sci en tific con texts. Of
course, this is not to say that sci ence can not in form meta phys i cal theo ris ing (or vice
versa), or that it ought not to.
A re lated mat ter of con sid er able im port, par tic u larly if we are to at tempt to al low for 
value judge ments as part of philo soph i cal po si tions, is that of the rel a tive value of sci -
en tists – or more prop erly sci en tific ac tiv ity – in the con text of the com mu nity at large, 
or even just the com mu nity of in quir ers. Ladyman (2004:136) asks: ‘[W]hy not al low
the em pir i cist to have a prag matic com mit ment to meta phys i cal the o ries, and to en ter -
tain them as ways the world might be ... ?’ And Van Fraassen (2004b:181) grants that
if meta phys i cal spec u la tion ‘has great heu ris tic and in spi ra tional value, let's en cour age
sci en tists to so far for get them selves as to con stantly en gage in it.’ Yet while this is not 
an un rea son able re sponse, on the face of it, we must be care ful not to as sume that spe -
cial sci en tists can sim ply ‘do meta phys ics’ at a whim, or im ply that to do meta phys ics
well is easy, and does not re quire spe cial train ing, or at least un der stand ing that must
be ac quired (and sus tained) by hard in tel lec tual toil. In fact, to al low this would be to
smug gle in what is plau si bly a car i ca ture based pre cisely on an em pir i cist value judge -
ment: that soi disant ‘meta phy si cians’ are idle dream ers, with min i mal in ter est in the
(ac tual) world about them, and less still in pos i tively con trib ut ing to so ci ety.
Need less to say, I do not ac cept such a pic ture. Fur ther more, I do not think it can be
the place of ev ery sci en tist, say, to grow and pre pare her own food, teach her chil dren,
look af ter her age ing par ents, and so forth. In so far as food is im por tant for all in so ci -
ety, we ask, “How many of us ought to be farm ers?” And in so far as in quir ers are im -
por tant to so ci ety, we ought to ask, “To which prob lems should their in tel lec tual ef -
forts be di rected?” But in do ing so, we need to un der stand the in ter nal dy namic of the
com mu nity of in quir ers. For in stance, in so far as math e mat ics is re quired for (good)
nat u ral sci ence, it might fol low that we need ded i cated math e ma ti cians, even if nat u ral 
sci ence is more valu able at the level of the in ter sec tion of the com mu nity of in quir ers
with other such com mu ni ties. If a dic tum such as ‘nat u ral sci en tific prob lems take pre -
ce dence’ is not to be taken merely to be an un der handed re pu di a tion of meta phys i cal
ac tiv ity, then what is needed is a strong ar gu ment that what meta phy si cians do, qua
meta phy si cians, is largely use less. And even then, it would seem it could still be con -
ceded that some meta phy si cians are use ful. So in this light, any sug ges tion that meta -
phys ics ought to be ut terly aban doned would seem to be im plau si bly strong. Imag ine
the vil lag ers who chase out one of their black smiths for work ing only on dis cov er ing
new al loys, when weap ons are ur gently re quired for a forth com ing con fron ta tion. And
imag ine then the dis may of the other black smiths, who are hop ing for a new al loy in
or der that they might craft su pe rior weap ons, which would ul ti mately be of greater
ben e fit to the vil lag ers. In short, Lipton (2004:153) is right to draw our at ten tion to the 
fact that, ‘Kuhn sug gests how a di ver gence in epistemic pol i cies per forms an es sen tial
epistemic func tion, by en abling the sci en tific com mu nity to hedge its epistemic bets.’
But in ad di tion to this, di ver gence in prac tices might ful fil a sim i lar func tion, in side as 
well as out side of sci ence. So even if it is not quite right to say that ‘stances’ are akin
to epistemic pol i cies, as I shall ex plain shortly, to the ex tent that they in volve par tic u -
lar ways of do ing things, or prompt in dul gence in par tic u lar sorts of ac tiv ity, it might
be a boon that there be con sid er able vari ance. More over, tol er ance might be rec om -
mended on prin ci pled epistemic grounds, with re spect to (many of) the prac tices so en -
cour aged, in spite of the 'stance(s)’ re spon si ble for mo ti vat ing them.
It is also worth putt ing all this in ac tual socio-eco nomic con text. It is hardly the case 
that our youth are clam our ing to be come meta phy si cians, or that phys ics de part ments
are be ing closed down in or der to make way for de part ments of phi los o phy, let alone
shiny new de part ments of meta phys ics! And from this point of view, Van Fraassen's
fo cus on meta phys ics seems rather cu ri ous. Af ter all, surely em pir i cism might be
better neg a tively char ac ter ised by its op po si tion to mys ti cism, su per sti tion, cult ism,
and fun da men tal ism? And from the per spec tive of the world at large, are these not
greater threats? Even if we re strict our at ten tion to what is oc cur ring within ac a de mia,
there are ar gu ably more ‘wor thy’ tar gets for the em pir i cist else where, as the in fa mous
Sokal hoax would seem to have clearly il lus trated. Yet as Beller (1998) ar gues, it is
plau si ble that the mys ti cal pro nounce ments of the ar chi tects of quan tum the ory – such
as Bohr, Heisenberg, and Börn – have con trib uted to such mis use, and mis un der stand -
ing, of sci ence.7 So why not ally em pir i cism with a re jec tion of any ul ti mate ap peal to,
or un crit i cal re spect for, au thor ity?
But let us pause and take stock. What we have found, I think, is that Van Fraassen's
ar gu ments are re ally against par tic u lar forms of meta phys ics – ‘naïve meta phys ics’
would seem to be a suit able mon i ker – in volv ing the view that rea son alone can lead
us to the ab so lute (or per haps, even more per ni ciously, cer tain) truth about the way
things ac tu ally are. Such naïve meta phys ics is even worse, he thinks, when it in volves
the hi jack ing of an al leged ‘method of sci ence’ – namely abductive rea son ing – which
its prac ti tio ners ap peal to in or der to de fend the re sults of the en ter prise. For in stance,
in the work of some ma te ri al ists, he de tects a def er ence to sci ence, qua au thor ity,
which he finds dis taste ful (Van Fraassen, 2002:63): ‘the be lief that the sci en tific de -
scrip tion of the world is true, in its en tirety or near enough, and at least a strong in cli -
na tion to wards com plete ness claims for the con tent of cer tain sci ences. “This is true,
and noth ing else is true” would ex press such claims.’ But of course any given meta -
phy si cian, or in deed any given ma te ri al ist, need not have that be lief. To which I might
add that this meta phy si cian finds the afore men tioned be lief to be just as re pug nant as
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phys i cists with ex ces sive rev er ence, rather than be ing sub jected to the crit i cal anal y sis they de serve. Fi -
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Van Fraassen does, and for sev eral shared rea sons: I too re ject the epistemic the sis, but 
not the se man tic the sis, of so-called ‘sci en tific re al ism’ (Psillos, 1999:xix).8
Here we reach the nub of this sec tion, which sets the stage for what fol lows: if em -
pir i cism can help it self to ‘stance’ in or der to avoid re quir ing a ‘Prin ci ple Zero’ (in the 
rel e vant sense ex plained by Teller), then why can ma te ri al ism not do the same? Can it
be right that what is good for the goose is not good for the gan der? And might there
not be some in di vid u als who can be cor rectly de scribed as ‘ma te ri al ists’, but will say
“On the off-chance that the sci en tific de scrip tion of the world is true, in its en tirety or
near enough, let us see what would be the case”? Who show no def er ence to sci ence,
yet nev er the less have an in ter est in its proc la ma tions, and have no false con scious ness
about the pro ject that they are un der tak ing? Who will tell us that they just so hap pen to 
be ‘ma te ri al ists’, but do not think that any one is ra tio nally com pelled to be a ‘ma te ri al -
ist’ ? Stay tuned for the an swers to all these ques tions, and more.
4. Voluntarism, Empiricism, and the Conceptualisation of ‘Stance’ 
Van Fraassen (2002:48) writes: ‘[I]f em pir i cism is a stance, its cri tique of meta phys ics 
will be based at least in part on some thing other than fac tual the ses: at ti tudes, com mit -
ments, val ues, goals.’ Yet what we have seen is that this claim is some what mis lead -
ing, at least taken out of con text. In par tic u lar, if em pir i cism is a ‘stance’ but there are
also meta phys i cal ‘stances’, then em pir i cism might only in volve a cri tique of par tic u -
lar forms of meta phys ics, viz. par tic u lar ‘meta phys i cal stances’ . (It is of ten un clear
whether Van Fraassen re ally wants to at tack ‘meta phys ics’ qua ac tiv ity, or just those
im plicit pol i cies that he thinks are li a ble to un der lie the ac tiv ity. So ‘meta phys i cal
stances’ might be better re placed by ‘meta phy si cians’ stances’, as we shall see.) To
which we might add that it is un clear that there need be just one ‘Em pir i cal Stance’:
there may be a va ri ety of em pir i cal ‘stances’, some of which might also be criti ci sable
on the ba sis of Van Fraassen's ‘Em pir i cal Stance’ . In other words ‘The Em pir i cal
Stance’ might pro vide a means by which to of fer a cri tique of ‘The Naïve Em pir i cal
Stance’, as well as ‘The Naïve Meta phys i cal Stance’, and so forth.
We now find our selves with a prob lem that I touched upon in the pre vi ous sec tion.
What is the scope of a ‘stance’ ? For ex am ple, if Van Fraassen has ‘The Em pir i cal
Stance’, then how close does my stance have to be to his, in terms of be liefs, opin ions,
at ti tudes, com mit ments, val ues, and goals, in or der for it to be that same ‘Em pir i cal
Stance’ ? It would seem that ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’ is be ing used as an um brella term
for a num ber of pos si ble in di vid ual philo soph i cal po si tions (per sonal stances), but un -
less we have a fixed ref er ence point, it is en tirely un clear how we are to eval u ate what
does and does not count as ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’ . Worse, it might seem that how we 
choose to group sets of per sonal stances is a mat ter of con ven tion. Why should Van
Fraassen's per sonal philo soph i cal po si tion be the bench mark for what counts as ‘The
Em pir i cal Stance’ ? And if it is not, then what is the bench mark? Could some one pos -
si bly show us what it is?
Of course, if to be an em pir i cist is not to hold that any par tic u lar prop o si tion is true
– to hold to an E+ for the E of em pir i cism – then it would seem that two empiricists
could dif fer on all their fac tual the ses, yet none the less share ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’ .
8 ‘Im por tant sim i lar i ties be tween the views of Pop per and Van Fraassen, which I will only be able to
touch on here, are: (a) each re jects the idea that sci en tific the o ries can gain de grees of con fir ma tion
(with re spect to truth, even if not em pir i cal ad e quacy); and (b) each for swears the claim that a con tem -
po rary the ory is typ i cally ap prox i mately true.
This is wholly im plau si ble (or would, at the very least, in volve con sid er able ‘prag -
matic in co her ence’ on one, or both, of their parts), but as we have seen in sec tion 2,
what is re ally im por tant is that there is no E+ held as a ‘the sis’ in the sense ex plained
by Teller (2004). So as Ladyman (2004:139) sug gests, one might ar gue that,
‘[B]elieving some X+ is at least a nec es sary con di tion for adopt ing a stance even if it
is not suf fi cient.’ And Van Fraassen (2004b:190, f.4) now seems to agree, if only by
way of al leged clar i fi ca tion, de spite his pre vi ous state ment that (2002:46): ‘[T]here
can not be such a prop o si tion as E+’ . The prob lem is solved, in prin ci ple if not in prac -
tice, be cause by spec i fy ing be liefs typ i cal of empiricists, we may come to un der stand
the stance that un der lies those be liefs, how ever im per fectly. But a smaller prob lem,
which re mains, is that once we set a bench mark for a given ‘Stance’, we will have to
de cide some sort of cut-off point, at which a per sonal stance is suf fi ciently dis tant to
no lon ger (nom i nally) be a vari ant of said ‘Stance’ . The most we can say, so far,
would seem to be that (Van Fraassen, 2004b:174): ‘[S]haring the same stance... en tails 
shar ing cer tain at ti tudes, typ i cally in clud ing cer tain be liefs, but al lows for many rel e -
vant dif fer ences as well.’ 
Here it is worth emphasising that Van Fraassen takes a par tic u lar as pi ra tion for epis -
te mol ogy to be cen tral to the em pir i cist tra di tion: for it to tackle the prob lems con cern -
ing sci en tific rev o lu tions, and con ver sions. Thus, he pro poses to take a per mis sive
view of ra tio nal ity, which he re fers to as vol un ta rism, such that (Van Fraassen,
2004a:129): ‘ “[W]hat is ra tio nal is what ever is ra tio nally per mit ted”: ra tio nal ity is
bri dled ir ra tio nal ity.’ He ap peals to the ‘boringly re pet i tive fail ures of the idea of In -
duc tion and sim i lar rule-gov erned con cepts of ra tio nal opin ion and man age ment’ (Van 
Fraas sen, 2004b:182) by way of sup port, but with out even a sin gle men tion of Pop -
per.9 As I in tend to ex plain in the next sec tion, this is in tel lec tu ally cu ri ous given not
only that Pop per was a voluntarist, but also that his ar gu ments against so-called in duc -
tive in fer ences – pre cisely, that these are not ra tio nally com pel ling – have not been
widely ac cepted. For ex am ple, Wil liam son (2005a:12) ad vo cates Ob jec tive
Bayesianism, ac cord ing to which, ‘[O]nly one value for p(v) will be deemed ra tio nal
on the ba sis of an agent's back ground knowl edge ... [T]wo agents with the same back -
ground knowl edge must adopt the same prob a bil i ties as their ra tio nal de grees of be -
lief.’ There fore, it is ex tremely dis ap point ing of Van Fraassen (2004b:179) to claim:
‘The most con cise way to in di cate the em pir i cist tra di tion's ten den cies in epis te mol ogy 
is once again to point to the sorts of meta phys ics it re jects.’ This is like say ing that the
most con cise way to in di cate what a car ni vore tends to eat is to point to choc o late ice
creams! Be ing con cise is not only a mat ter of be ing brief, but also of be ing com pre -
hen sively so, af ter all. Be sides which, any sug ges tion that in tel lec tu al ism is in com pat i -
ble with vol un ta rism should, as I hope to show, be re sisted.
At this junc ture, it will prove use ful for us to draw upon the no tion of an epistemic
pol icy, which is pre sented by Teller (2004) as a func tional char ac teri sa tion of ‘stance’, 
and which ‘pro vides valu able in sight into the con cept’, ac cord ing to Van Fraassen
(2004b:174). On the sur face, the idea is de cep tively sim ple, yet Teller pro vides an ex -
ten sive list of how one might char ac ter ise a pol icy, and how these char ac teri sa tions
might also hold for stances: pol i cies are ex pres sions or im ple men ta tions of val ues; pol -
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9 N.B. By ‘In duc tion', Van Fraassen (2004b: 182) means: ‘the pu ta tive rec ipe or rules that spell out a con -
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i cies can be ar gued for or against; ev ery one has a pol icy; and so forth. I can not do full
jus tice to his dis cus sion, here, but it has three as pects that I want to cover. The first is
that Teller dis tin guishes be tween ex plicit stances, on the one hand, and im plicit
stances, on the other. The for mer in volve what is ex plic itly for mu lated, whereas the
lat ter can in volve ‘prac tices... learned and ac cepted with out crit i cal ex am i na tion... ex -
er cised unreflectively... that [none the less] func tion as epistemic guides' (Teller, 2004:
165). But in re sponse it might be urged that a pol icy is usu ally taken to be ex plicit,
such that one might sign up to it (ac cord ing, per haps, to one's own in ter pre ta tion), al -
though it might very well be ad vo cated by one who takes a par tic u lar po si tion. So I
join Van Fraassen (2004b: 178) in think ing that ‘stance' must be closer to the im plicit
no tion. As such, he ad mits that ‘The Em pir i cist Stance' would have been a better name 
for his re cent book, and sug gests that ‘The Em pir i cal Stance' would be best left to re -
fer to an ex plicit pol icy which empiricists – those with em pir i cist stances – might ad -
vo cate. (In fact, Teller (2004: 168) ac cu rately sur mises: ‘Per haps “stance” better than
“pol icy” con notes im plicit as well as ex plicit modes.') Van Fraassen (2004b: 179) is
also quick, and quite right, to emphasise that an epistemic pol icy is not an
epistemological po si tion. Hence, one might have a stance with out hav ing the faint est
idea that there are epistemological po si tions, whereas for mu lat ing or sup port ing a pol -
icy would seem to have to be, or at least typ i cally be, an in ten tional ac tion.
Sec ond, we should note that Teller (2004:166) urges that a pol icy is not true or false, 
but rather well or ill-ad vised; sim i larly, Lipton (2004:149) thinks that, ‘Some body
who makes the wrong choice of stance is un wise, but not ir ra tio nal.’ How ever, this
pre sum ably co mes about since ‘ra tio nal’ has ac quired a rather tech ni cal sense through
its use in the sub jec tive in ter pre ta tion of prob a bil ity, ac cord ing to which an agent is ra -
tio nal just if her de grees of be lief do not vi o late the ap pro pri ate math e mat i cal ax i -
oms.10 But I con tend that this tech ni cal sense can not just be as sumed, since it is highly
du bi ous that the sub jec tive in ter pre ta tion is suf fi cient to ex plain what it is for us to re -
ally be ra tio nal, in the ev ery day sense of ‘rea son able’ . Con sider that all epistemic
prob a bil i ties – but per haps not ale a tory prob a bil i ties – are fun da men tally con di tional,
as Keynes (1921:6-7) force fully ar gues. The ques tion arises as to whether ‘back ground 
knowl edge’, so of ten in voked by Bayesians, ought re ally to be con strued just as ‘back -
ground in for ma tion’, and it is un clear that the an swer lies in the af fir ma tive. Let me
put it this way: are we re ally go ing to al low that a ma chine which merely as signs co -
her ent eval u a tions of the ex tent to which one set of in for ma tion is con tained by an -
other, when pro vided with such sets, is ra tio nal? I am afraid that this idea seems ut -
terly bi zarre, and would urge that it is only in vir tue of the fact that our ‘back ground
knowl edge’ is more than a col lec tion of prop o si tional en ti ties that we are ca pa ble of
be ing ra tio nal. To which I might add that there are pre sum ably ra tio nal hope-mak ing
pro cesses, fear-mak ing pro cesses, and so forth, which can clearly not be ac counted for 
by any pres ently avail able the o ries of prob a bil ity. I do not think that this is just a ver -
bal is sue, at root. Rather it is a gen u ine dis agree ment about the scope of ra tio nal ity, for 
as Ladyman (2004:142) also sug gests, along a closely re lated line, ‘[V]oluntarism
seems to be a ca pit u la tion of rea son to in stru men tal ra tio nal ity. It is surely part of a ra -
tio nal agent's ob li ga tions to have re al is tic ex pec ta tions of his or her ac tions.’ The is sue 
is one of ‘di rec tion of fit’, and it re mains un clear why un der stand ing how things are
(and might be) is suf fi cient to en able a rea son able in ter ac tion with our sur round ings,
par tic u larly with re spect to our fel lows: in deed, surely it is the case that we seek to un -
10 See, for in stance, the dis cus sion of the Ramsey-de Finetti the o rem in Gill ies (2000: 53-65).
der stand how we would pre fer for things to be, for eth i cal rea sons or oth er wise, as
well as how we would pre fer for things not to be. In the terms in which Macleod
(1986: 59) puts this, I am there fore in fa vour of a ‘type 3’  anal y sis of ‘ra tio nal ity’ , in
con trast to the ‘type 1’  and ‘type 2’  anal y ses which seem to have been fa voured in
clas si cal epis te mol ogy:
The o ries (Type 1 the o ries, let us call them) for which it is be liefs and be lief
alone to which terms like ra tio nal and ir ra tio nal are prop erly ap pli ca ble will be 
very dif fer ent, cer tainly in scope and prob a bly also in struc ture, from (Type 2)
the o ries for which ac tions and de ci sions can also be said to be ra tio nal and ir ra -
tio nal. And both will be dif fer ent from (Type 3) the o ries, which seem to make
room in ad di tion for ra tio nal ap praisal of an agent's de sires and pref er ences and 
of the ends, ide als, and prin ci ples as so ci ated with them.
Now it could be con tended, quite rea son ably, that ‘stance’ is ac tu ally a means by
which to widen the scope of ra tio nal ity, and that this is re ally what Van Fraassen in -
tends with his vol un ta rism. But no tice that if a ‘type 3’ anal y sis is cor rect, then we
have to ad mit that there might be flatly ir ra tio nal, rather than merely un wise, stances.
(‘The Nazi Stance’, taken in his tor i cal con text, springs to mind.) Of course, this is not
to pre sume that there is only one ra tio nal stance, al though it might very well be the
case that all ra tio nal stances share a par tic u lar com po nent (or com po nents). Lipton
(2004:155) writes, ‘[T]he cru cial ques tion is whether prin ci ples of ra tio nal ity de ter -
mine the stance: the tra di tion al ist says yes, the voluntarist says no.’ But he ne glects the 
mid dle ground, since the prin ci ples of ra tio nal ity might par tially de ter mine the stance,
in so far as they de ter mine the ra tio nally per mis si ble set of stances, given an ap pro pri -
ate con text.
This brings me on to the third, and fi nal, is sue: that of what I shall call stance vol un -
ta rism, which ought not to be con fused with epistemological vol un ta rism (to which I
re fer sim ply as ‘vol un ta rism’ ). For al though Van Fraassen (2004b:175) claims, ‘[A]
stance, like a pol icy or strat egy, is some thing one can adopt or re ject’, this is ac tu ally a 
rather con ten tious claim, pro vided ‘adopt or re ject’ are con strued in an in ten tional
sense. In say ing this, I have in mind the the sis of doxastic involuntarism, ad vo cated by 
Alston (1989:115-142), to which a di rect an a logue might be made. To what ex tent can 
it be right that one can ac tu ally se lect one's stance, if at all? And could Van Fraassen
adopt ‘The Intellectualist Stance’, say, through sim ple ‘force of will’ ? Of course, ad -
vo cat ing a pol icy, say an ex plicit man i festo com mit ment of a po lit i cal party, is a rather 
sim ple in ten tional ac tion. Adopt ing that pol icy, or im ple ment ing it, is typ i cally sim i -
larly achiev able, al beit af ter her me neu tic ap praisal. Yet in the im plicit sense of ‘pol -
icy’ that is closer to cap tur ing the no tion of ‘stance’, the sit u a tion would seem to be
quite dif fer ent. For in stance, how could one in ten tion ally change one's stance, if one
did n't real ise what that stance was? And even if one is aware of one's own stance, to
what ex tent can its dis tinc tive com po nents be al tered at a whim, even with the ben e fit
of deep re flec tion? If Van Fraassen (2004a:128) is cor rect not only that stances ‘may
in clude some fac tual be liefs’, but also that ‘[O]ne is gen er ally less com mit ted to a pol -
icy than a stance’ (Van Fraassen, 2004b:191, f.14), then stance involuntarism would
seem to be strongly mo ti vated. Yet, I wish to mo ti vate stance vol un ta rism, since I dis -
agree with Van Fraassen (2004b:176-177) that,
[A] stance is not a state: the term “stance” has its own con no ta tions of com mit -
ment and in ten tion: spe cif i cally, the com mit ment to pre serve one self in that
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very stance ... There is a prag matic in con sis tency in “I am com mit ted to do ing x 
but not com mit ted to main tain ing this com mit ment.”
I am not en tirely sure what ‘prag matic in con sis tency’ is sup posed to be, and how it re -
lates to ‘prag matic in co her ence’, which was men tioned ear lier. But nev er the less, this
claim seems to be pa tently false. If I am com mit ted to meet ing you for din ner next
week, but you phone me to can cel be cause one of your rel a tives has just passed away,
then surely it would be ri dic u lous to sug gest that I ought to be com mit ted to main tain -
ing the orig i nal com mit ment to meet you for din ner, on pain of be ing in con sis tent; that 
I ought to urge you nev er the less to meet me for din ner – so as to al low me to main tain
my com mit ment to meet you for din ner – if I am not to be ‘prag mat i cally in con sis tent’ . 
On the con trary, there would seem to be no in con sis tency, prag matic or oth er wise, in
sim ply dis card ing the com mit ment. Now I sup pose Van Fraassen might re join by giv -
ing a dif fer ent ex am ple, say on the ques tion of whether one would al low one self to be
brain washed, given the un der stand ing that this would ‘re move’ a com mit ment. But
this is ac tu ally rather dif fer ent: to do one's best to ful fil one's com mit ment is not to do
one's best to pre serve that com mit ment, and in any event, the com mit ment would ar gu -
ably re main de spite the brain wash ing. For un der stand ing that one has a com mit ment is 
not the same as hav ing that com mit ment, and striv ing to re main aware of one's com -
mit ment is not the same as striv ing to main tain that com mit ment. Fur ther more, to re -
turn to the ini tial ex am ple, if you phone me back an hour later in or der to ask me
whether I would still meet you for din ner, only to be in formed that I now have dif fer -
ent plans, you ought not to feel that you have the right to re buke me for re fus ing, let
alone to ac cuse me of in con sis tency! As such, I take it that a stance is a state, and is
one that we can (and can be will ing to), un der the cor rect cir cum stances, ex er cise a
con sid er able de gree of con trol over. In par tic u lar, I would urge that we can pre pare
our selves to change stance, say as a re sult of a crit i cal dis cus sion on which stance it is
best to adopt, pro vided we adopt the crit i cal at ti tude to which I shall turn in short or -
der.
Be fore hand, in or der to bol ster the no tion of stance vol un ta rism, I want to ex am ine a 
closely re lated is sue. Can it be right that at ti tudes, com mit ments, val ues, and goals, are 
ac tu ally in de pend ent of be liefs and opin ions? Or as a mat ter of fact, is the sit u a tion re -
ally much more com pli cated? Is it pos si ble, even in prin ci ple, for me to share (or to
have shared) no be liefs or opin ions with Van Fraassen, yet none the less adopt ex actly
the same at ti tudes, com mit ments, val ues, and goals? It would seem not, and that the
‘[V]arious in gre di ents can not be hy gien i cally dis en tan gled and sep a rated.’ (Van
Fraassen, 2004b:176). Hence, it might seem that a per sonal stance is re ally com posed
of a par tic u lar set of prop o si tional at ti tudes (be liefs, hopes, fears, and so forth), along
with a par tic u lar mode of en gage ment.11
Fig.1 (see next page) might re sult from an un imag i na tive and un gen er ous read ing of
The Em pir i cal Stance, but the model in fig.2 would seem to con sti tute some sort of
im prove ment, pro vided stances are to be con strued as states. And no tice that both the
fig ures are sup posed to de pict in di vid ual, per sonal, stances. A wider ‘Stance’ (cap i tal
S), such as ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’, would then be formed by a set of per sonal stances
(qua states). In other words, if E is ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’, then this might be the set
{s1, s2, s3, ... sN}; if I hap pen to have the per sonal stance s1, then this counts as hav -
11 Al though Van Fraassen (2004b: 175) writes, 'to love some thing or some one, to be con temp tu ous or en -
am oured: these at ti tudes can not be equated with prop o si tional at ti tudes’, he pro vides no ar gu ment to
this ef fect.
ing ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’, since s1 is a mem ber of E. Of course, we are also left with 
the op tion of say ing that there are per sonal stances that are mem bers of more than one
wider ‘Stance’ . And per haps this is what we ought to ex pect: for in stance, one might
have ‘The Crit i cal Stance’  (C), while also hav ing ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’  (E), but
one might also have C with out hav ing E. The sit u a tion could be as de picted be low, in
fig.3:
Fig. 3 – Po ten tial Re la tion ship be tween Two ‘Stances’ 
Now putt ing prob lems with in fin i ties aside – and it is plau si ble that there are an in fi -
nite num ber of per sonal stances that con sti tute, say, ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’ – it might
be rea son able to sug gest that one might iden tify Stances on the ba sis of modes of en -
gage ment which do not bear any strong bidirectional re la tion ship to prop o si tional at ti -
tudes. True, it might be that one can not achieve these modes of en gage ment (or ini -
tially adopt them) with out hav ing one of a par tic u lar set of prop o si tional at ti tudes, but
they might be re sis tant (to a greater or lesser de gree) to any fu ture changes in prop o si -
tional at ti tudes, once they are adopted. So one could say that all mem bers of E in volve 
one and the same mode of en gage ment. Like wise, for all the mem bers of C. No tice, of
course, that the mode of en gage ment will plau si bly have a strong ef fect on how the
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prop o si tional at ti tudes ac tu ally change. How could E and C, say, over lap? The an swer 
would lie in the fact that modes of en gage ment can have dif fer ent scopes, such that
they do not nec es sar ily pre clude one an other.
But is the no tion of a ‘mode of en gage ment’ not just as vague as that of a ‘stance’ ?
I take the an swer to lie in the neg a tive in so far as we are all fa mil iar with the idea that
dif fer ent peo ple have dif fer ent ap proaches to the world (and/or par tic u lar sorts of sit u -
a tion), which they are some times ca pa ble of mov ing be tween. A clas sic dis tinc tion,
em ployed by St. Teresa of Avila in The Way of Per fec tion, is be tween the ac tive and
con tem pla tive. Fur ther more, the idea of such ap proaches cap tures neatly the idea of a
pos ture, with out need ing to en com pass that of a van tage point, thereby en abling easy
disambiguation be tween these two as pects of ‘stance’, ac cord ing to Van Fraassen
(2004b:174). This is im por tant since the fact that two in di vid u als dif fer in pos ture
might re flect that they dif fer in van tage point, al though it need not. And in say ing this,
I do not want to sug gest that one's pos ture never has an ef fect on one's van tage point.
For in stance, an ac tive so cial pos ture might lead to a more op ti mis tic out look than a
pas sive (and con tem pla tive) in tro verted one. In deed, the way in which we judge the
sig nif i cance of our own ac tions in a wider con text is clearly af fected, al beit in di rectly,
by our pos ture.
More over, such a no tion is sup port ive of the no tion of stance vol un ta rism. For it is a 
rea son ably com mon view that cer tain in di vid u als have a dis po si tion for en gag ing in
one par tic u lar fash ion in a given con text – say an ac tive one, as op posed to a pas sive
one – but that they can nev er the less have some level of di rect con trol of how they do,
in fact, en gage. By con trast, the idea that one has di rect con trol over one's van tage
point – as op posed to in di rect con trol, via the adop tion of dif fer ing modes of en gage -
ment (or pos tures) – seems much more con tro ver sial. In fact, it is just as im plau si ble to 
sug gest that one can spon ta ne ously de cide not to be un happy at wit ness ing a ter ri ble
di sas ter as it is that one can spon ta ne ously de cide not to be lieve that one is wit ness ing
said di sas ter. One might lis ten to up lift ing mu sic in or der to al ter one's mood, or one
might visit a hyp no tist in or der to al ter one's be lief that a ter ri ble di sas ter had oc curred, 
but such changes would be via in di rect mech a nisms, as ex plained by Steup (2000).
5. The Critical Attitude, Pancritical Rationalism, and
Non-Dogmatic Empiricism
Hav ing gone to con sid er able ef fort to un der stand and elu ci date Van Fraassen's line
against par tic u lar forms of meta phys ics, to iden tify said forms, and to pro vide an un -
der stand ing of how all this re lates to the no tion of ‘stance’, I have set the stage for my
fi nal con ten tion. To put the cart be fore the horse, this is that in or der for em pir i cism to
be non-dog matic, it must in volve a crit i cal at ti tude – or what might be called a crit i cal
mode of en gage ment – with re spect to a par tic u lar do main. How ever, I con tend that,
since this at ti tude is char ac ter is tic of Bartley's pancritical ra tio nal ism, it is re ally this
that can solve the prob lem of ‘Prin ci ple Zero’ for em pir i cism, which Van Fraassen in -
tro duces ‘stance’ in or der to ad dress. More over, I urge that pancritical ra tio nal ism pro -
vides a broader form of vol un ta rism than that which Van Fraassen holds is re quired
for em pir i cism, but also sug gests a neater so lu tion to the prob lem of con cep tual
change in sci en tific rev o lu tions, which he iden ti fies as cru cial for the em pir i cist to
tackle. In fact, I ar gue that it is just in so far as ‘An Em pir i cist Stance’ shies away from 
pancritical ra tio nal ism that it is dog matic, and that given this, Van Fraassen's ‘Em pir i -
cal Stance’ re mains dog matic.
In or der to in tro duce the idea of the crit i cal at ti tude, and its pu ta tive sig nif i cance, let
me first use the words of Pop per (1968:94-95):
[W]hat char ac ter izes the sci en tific ap proach is a highly crit i cal at ti tude to ward
our the o ries rather than a for mal cri te rion of refutability: only in the light of
such a crit i cal at ti tude and the cor re spond ing crit i cal meth od olog i cal ap proach
do ‘re fut able’ the o ries re tain their refutability ... [T]he de mar ca tion be tween
sci ence and meta phys ics is a spe cial case of the wider prob lem of de mar cat ing
criticizable from non-criticizable the o ries ... the lat ter prob lem is at any rate the
more gen eral one.
Now by ‘criticizable’, here, we must note that Pop per surely meant ‘criticizable on the
ba sis of sen sory ex pe ri ence’, which he would have cashed out as ‘criticizable on the
ba sis of ba sic (or ob ser va tion) state ments’ . (All too of ten, the ‘by sen sory ex pe ri ence’ 
clause is as sumed in his writ ing.) Fur ther, there might be some con fu sion about the
scope of ‘meta phys ics’ for Pop per, but his over arch ing ap proach seems to be summed
up rather well by one of his most vo cif er ous, yet also most care ful, crit ics (O' Hear,
1980:111):
Ra tio nal ity ... con sists pri mar ily in elim i nat ing er rors and learn ing from them.
This pro cess is not pe cu liar to em pir i cal sci ence, nor is em pir i cal sci ence fur -
thered by em pir i cal test ing alone, al though it is un doubt edly true that change
be cause of em pir i cal test ing is one im por tant mark of the sci en tific and serves
to dis tin guish it from con ser va tive and em pir i cally closed sys tems such as Af ri -
can magic ... the im por tance of dis tin guish ing be tween sci ence and non-sci ence 
seems to di min ish in com par i son with the im por tance of dis tin guish ing what
counts as a crit i cal as op posed to a dog matic ap proach in each par tic u lar field
of ac tiv ity.
Un for tu nately, this way of un der stand ing Pop per's philo soph i cal ap proach is un com -
mon, al though I will not be able to fully de fend it here. In stead, let me point out that it
tends to be en dorsed by those who were clos est to Pop per. As Boland (1994) ex plains, 
it is a ‘So cratic view’ that can be rather dif fi cult to ap pre ci ate, be cause:
The pre sump tion taken for granted by all fol low ers of the nor mal view says that 
we would have to jus tify our knowl edge be fore we can claim to know any thing
... What is most dis turb ing for Pop per's dis ci ples is the pre sump tion that any
suc cess in sci ence must be due to a prac ticed sci en tific meth od ol ogy. Again,
the dis ci ples take the view that meth od ol ogy has no more guar an tees than a So -
cratic di a logue.
Cue Bartley, who at tempted to for mu late a rev o lu tion ary epistemological view that has 
had lit tle im pact due to the per va sive na ture of the afore men tioned as sump tion in the
philo soph i cal com mu nity.12 Bartley (1962:109-10) sums this up pel lu cidly, un der the
flag ‘com pre hen sive ra tio nal ism’ (which was Pop per's orig i nal phrase, from The Open 
So ci ety and its En e mies):
The most com mon con cep tion of ra tio nal ist iden tity, com pre hen sive ra tio nal -
ism, com bines two re quire ments. (1) A ra tio nal ist ac cepts any po si tion that can
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thought, as op posed to the in verse: the fo cal point of their dis agree ment is Lakatos and Musgrave
(1968).
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be jus ti fied or es tab lished by ap peal to the ra tio nal cri te ria or au thor i ties; and
(2) he ac cepts only those po si tions that can be so jus ti fied ... In the ste reo typed
way in which it is usu ally told, the his tory of mod ern phi los o phy fo cuses at ten -
tion on a num ber of ba si cally sub or di nate ques tions that arise only if com pre -
hen sive ra tio nal ism is as sumed to be pos si ble. Among these, the most im por tant 
has prob a bly been: What is the na ture of the ra tio nal au thor ity or cri te rion to
which a ra tio nal ist ap peals to jus tify all his opin ions? The var i ous the o ries of
knowl edge are func tions of the an swers phi los o phers have given to this ques -
tion. These an swers fall into two main cat e go ries:
(1) Ac cord ing to the intellectualists (or Ra tio nal ists – with a cap i tal “R”), the
ra tio nal au thor ity lies in the in tel lect (or Rea son). A ra tio nal ist jus ti fies his be -
liefs by ap peal ing to in tel lec tual in tu ition.
(2) Ac cord ing to the empiricists, the ra tio nal au thor ity lies in sense ex pe ri ence.
An em pir i cist jus ti fies his be liefs by ap peal ing to sense ob ser va tion.
The his tory of these an swers is one of fail ure.
His so lu tion is re mark ably sim ple, and in volves ab so lutely no ap peal to au thor ity, or
any slip into ar bi trary the ory se lec tion. Rather, he in vokes the sim ple idea of as sess -
ment of the cur rent state of the on go ing de bate, and pref er ence on the ba sis of that as -
sess ment. That is, in so far as there is to be ‘faith’ in any thing, this would be ‘faith’ in
our selves: but that can hardly be any sort of ‘faith’, since we don't re ally have any op -
tion on this level.13 The core idea is that we can ‘step out side’ of the o ries, with re spect
to any ir ra tio nal at tach ment (or com mit ment) we may have to them. Bartley
(1984:215-216) puts it so:
The test state ments are in tended to be hy po thet i cal, and criti ci sable and re vis -
able, just like ev ery thing else in the sys tem; there is no jus ti fi ca tion, no proof,
no fixed point any where. There is noth ing “ba sic” about ba sic state ments. And
hence no pos si bil ity of dog ma tism with re spect to them. If such ba sic state -
ments hap pen to be in com pat i ble with a the ory, then the the ory is false rel a tive
to them; and they are false rel a tive to the the ory. There is no ques tion of the ory
prov ing re ports wrong, or re ports prov ing the ory wrong. Both could be wrong:
nei ther is “ba sic” ... [O]ne steps out side the positionality of the the ory to com -
ment on the state of ex am i na tion of the the ory, treat ing the the ory as an ob ject,
not as one's point of view, and one self com ing from be yond the the ory ...14
But re call the fla vour of Van Fraassen's ob jec tions to what I have dubbed ‘naïve meta -
phys ics’: that it in volves an ap peal to ab duc tion, and the adop tion of a very def er ent
view to wards the con tent of con tem po rary sci ence. Might all this be summed up by
say ing that its pro po nents lack the crit i cal at ti tude to wards sci en tific the o ries? What
13 It will not do to dis agree by say ing we could place faith in ‘God's word', or the like, in stead. For we
would still need to as sume (if only im plic itly) that we were ca pa ble of iden ti fy ing said word, un der -
stand ing it, and so forth! In this sense, the pancritical ra tio nal ist ap proach is min i mal in so far as ‘faith'
is con cerned, at the very least. 
14 Bartley does not, I think, go quite far enough. A the ory can be ‘false’ rel a tive to some ba sic prop o si -
tions (ex pressed by state ments, or sen tence types, no doubt), yes, but this ‘fal sity’ is in its own turn rel a -
tive to a par tic u lar sys tem of logic. Fallibilism about logic is best un der stood as a com po nent of
‘pancritical ra tio nal ism’, as is sug gested by Miller (1994:90-92).
Van Fraassen would seem to be af ter, on the other hand, is closer to a pancritical ap -
proach. As he puts it (Van Fraassen, 2002:63):
All our fac tual be liefs are to be given over as hos tages to for tune, to the for -
tunes of fu ture em pir i cal ev i dence, and given up where they fail, with out suc -
cumb ing to de spair, cyn i cism, or de bil i tat ing rel a tiv ism.
How ever, it is en tirely un clear what force the ‘em pir i cal’ in this quo ta tion is sup posed
to have. Why not sim ply be will ing to change all one's fac tual be liefs on the ba sis of
fu ture ev i dence? Af ter all, it can not be a foun da tional prop o si tion of em pir i cism, qua
the sis in Teller's sense, that “All ev i dence is em pir i cal ev i dence”. But if the em pir i cist
is only to al low such a claim to be chal lenged by (al leged) em pir i cal ev i dence, then
she would be ren der ing it ef fec tively uncriticisable. Sim i larly, the intellectualist who
claims that no (al leged) em pir i cal ev i dence is ad mis si ble is not go ing to be per suaded
that it ought to be on the ba sis of an (al leged) in tu ition. More over, why treat a the ory
(T) that our ob ser va tions have a re li able char ac ter – or are some sort of ‘route to
knowl edge’ – any more se ri ously than a given the ory (T2) that some ob ser va tions are
be ing used to test? Is the sug ges tion that we should be com mit ted to T, or ac cept it on
faith? That we should dog mat i cally, or at the very least ar bi trarily, ac cept (some form
of) em pir i cism?
Am I be ing un fair to Van Fraassen? No, since he makes it ab so lutely clear that his
vol un ta rism – that re quired by ‘The Em pir i cal Stance’ – is to be re stricted to ‘as sess -
ment of ev i dence and/or the up dat ing in re sponse to what is ac cepted as ev i dence’
(Van Fraassen, 2004b:187). It is not a part of his em pir i cism that one be al lowed to en -
ter tain the idea that there might be non-em pir i cal ev i dence, so my ac cu sa tion is that it
is based on a fun da men tal bias about what counts as ev i dence. Van Fraassen
(2004b:181) writes: ‘[O]nly if a the ory has em pir i cal im port it is sub ject to test’ . But
this is clearly false, since a the ory can be tested, and found want ing, on the ba sis of
non-em pir i cal fea tures such as in ter nal log i cal in con sis ten cies, its fail ure to pro vide a
so lu tion to the prob lem that it was de signed to ad dress, or ex ter nal in con sis ten cies
with other the o ries in nearby do mains. The in com pat i bil ity of spe cial rel a tiv ity and
quan tum the ory is non-triv ial.
Again, he writes, ‘As in sci ence, so in phi los o phy: dis agree ment with any ad mis si ble 
fac tual hy poth e sis is ad mis si ble’, yet that this does not come from tol er ance, but in -
stead ‘per tains quite nar rowly to fac tual truth and er ror’ (Van Fraassen, 2004b:185).
But to re it er ate, why should non-empiricists need to at tempt to con vince an em pir i cist
by us ing only what that em pir i cist takes to be ad mis si ble? That is, by prof fer ing im ma -
nent crit i cism alone? Will the em pir i cist do the intellectualist an equiv a lent fa vour,
and not rely on any em pir i cal ev i dence what so ever, in ad vanc ing her ar gu ments
against in tel lec tu al ism? Surely not, and for a rather sim ple rea son: in dis cuss ing what
means of crit i cism are ad mis si ble, we can not pre sup pose that only par tic u lar means of 
crit i cism are ad mis si ble! And surely a non-dog matic em pir i cist does want to be able to 
take part in such a dis cus sion?15
Is pancritical ra tio nal ism com pat i ble with vol un ta rism, though? My an swer is in the
af fir ma tive, since it arose through Pop per's vol un ta rism. First, a bold hy poth e sis is per -
fectly per mis si ble, ac cord ing to the view that it is con text of jus ti fi ca tion, rather than
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2005, 24(3) 219
15 I can not make it my busi ness to de fend pancritical ra tio nal ism here, but ought to point out that Bartley
(1984:120) ar gues that it is vul ner a ble to crit i cism. If it were not, then it would fall foul of his tu
quoque, ex plained in sec tion 2.
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con text of dis cov ery, which is im por tant with re spect to suc cess ful (or ra tio nal) in -
quiry. It is not so much the ini tial clas si fi ca tion of a prop o si tion (or the ory) as ‘true’ or 
‘false’ which mat ters, but how one deals with (and more im por tantly is will ing to deal
with) that clas si fi ca tion in the light of crit i cism. So a ‘crit i cal ra tio nal ist’ in Pop per's
sense would not agree with the fol low ing sort of dic tum from main stream epis te mol -
ogy (Steup, 1997:377): ‘Our epistemic duty is to ... sus pend judge ment about p if our
ev i dence nei ther sup ports nor con tra dicts p’ . No tice the af fin ity with Van Fraassen's
(2004b:186): ‘[P]rinciple of tol er ance con cern ing fac tual state ments ... [that] they all
have an ini tial right to life.’ 
In fact, this links into Pop per's views on prob a bil ity and (the lack of) con fir ma tion.
For while he agreed with Keynes (1921:11) that prob a bil ity ‘In its most fun da men tal
sense ... re fers to the log i cal re la tion be tween two sets of prop o si tions ...’, he ut terly
dis agreed that ‘De riv a tive from this sense, we have the sense in which ... the term
prob a ble is ap plied to the de grees of ra tio nal be lief’ . Pop per (1959:§83) stated very
clearly that:
Ex pressed in my ter mi nol ogy, Keynes's the ory im plies that cor rob o ra tion (or
the prob a bil ity of hy poth e ses) de creases with testability. He is led to this view
by his be lief in in duc tive logic ... If what we value most is the se cur est knowl -
edge avail able – and if pre dic tions as such con trib ute noth ing to wards cor rob o -
ra tion – why then may we not rest con tent with our ba sic state ments?
In deed, de spite the con sid er able con fu sion that has of ten arisen with re spect to Pop -
per's cor rob o ra tion func tion, it must be noted that he spec i fied a spe cific do main in
which it gives a mean ing ful value, which is richly sug ges tive of the sig nif i cance of a
crit i cal at ti tude: ‘C(h,e) must not be in ter preted as the de gree of cor rob o ra tion of h by
e, un less e re ports the re sults of our sin cere ef forts to over throw h. The re quire ment of
sin cer ity can not be for mal ized ...’ (Pop per, 1959:418). Pop per re jected the no tion that
the prin ci ple of in dif fer ence was a syn thetic a pri ori prin ci ple, and would sim i larly re -
ject the log i cal com po nent of con tem po rary Ob jec tive Bayesianism, which Wil liam son 
(2005b:§13) ex plains as: ‘The agent's be lief func tion pb should oth er wise [i.e. when
em pir i cal ev i dence is taken into ac count] be as non-com mit tal as pos si ble.’ In fact, this 
might be ex plained el e gantly by ap peal to Teller's no tion of epistemic pol icy, treated
in the pre vi ous sec tion. Wil liam son's log i cal con straint looks like an ex plicit state ment 
of an im plicit pol icy that is not a pre req ui site of ra tio nal ity, ac cord ing to ei ther Pop per 
or Van Fraassen.
Fi nally, it might also be said – per haps some what more con tro ver sially – that Pop per 
did not pro claim in duc tive leaps to be im per mis si ble. Rather, as Set tle (1990)
emphasises, that Pop per re jected any epistemic law such that: one ought not com mit to 
be lief in p un less one is in pos ses sion of good rea sons for this be lief. Echo ing Bartley's 
sen ti ments, Set tle (1990) urges:
Irrationalism be comes a ra tio nally ex cused al ter na tive, if al most noth ing worth
be liev ing can be ra tio nally jus ti fied. Pop per's al ter na tive to the de mand that to
be ra tio nally ten a ble our be liefs must be ra tio nally jus ti fi able, is then some thing 
of a re lief. On his view, a per son is ra tio nally per mit ted to hold views that can -
not be ra tio nally jus ti fied, pro vided that they are not ra tio nally pro hib ited, and
pro vided they are not held dog mat i cally (un crit i cally) ... [Popperians] think the
point is that in duc tive in fer ences are not com pel ling, so that no one should be
thought ir ra tio nal who re frains from ac cept ing con clu sions from them. Other
peo ple think it ir ra tio nal not to be lieve what in duc tion sup ports, even though
in duc tion is non-dem on stra tive. I find it hard to sym pa thize with this lat ter
view, hard to lo cate what it is about in duc tive ar gu ments that war rants such a
de mand upon my al le giance. And I agree with Pop per that the view seems mis -
chie vous. Why should I feel ra tio nally com pelled, as op posed to psy cho log i -
cally or phys i cally con strained, to be lieve what may turn out to be false? And
why ra tio nally com pelled, as op posed to in vited or at tracted? If the con clu sions
of non-dem on stra tive ar gu ments with true pre mises could be false, would not
that be a rea son for re frain ing from be lief, for ex er cis ing cau tion, es pe cially if
the price of wrong be lief were high?
In short, so-called ‘in duc tive in fer ences’ were sim ply not for bid den in the sense that
one ought never to em ploy them as heuristics, say in or der to gen er ate a hy poth e sis or
two. Far from it, for Pop per (1983:80-88) him self of fered ar gu ments that were not ra -
tio nally com pel ling, as he readily ad mit ted.
6. Conclusion
In clos ing, there are two ten ta tive sug ges tions that I would like to make. The first is
with re spect to the prob lem of the ra tio nal ity of rad i cal con cep tual changes in sci ence,
which Van Fraassen takes it to be an im por tant task for any em pir i cist epis te mol ogy to 
tackle. He writes (Van Fraassen, 2004a:129-130):
[T]here are such changes. They are so rad i cal that they are char ac ter ized by a
re mark able his tor i cal asym me try. From the prior po si tion ... the pos te rior view
was ab surd and the tran si tion to it pos si ble but in ca pa ble of jus ti fi ca tion ...
[H]ow pre cisely can we un der stand the tran si tion as hav ing been in ac cord with 
rea son?
The un der ly ing pre sup po si tion is that, be cause a tran si tion is un jus ti fi able, it is there -
fore ir ra tio nal. But ac cord ing to Bartley's view, ra tio nal ity is linked to crit i cism, rather
than jus ti fi ca tion, such that the prob lem with which Van Fraassen strug gles does not
even seem to arise. It is ‘solved’, in so far as it is dis solved: such changes are mo ti -
vated by crit i cal ac tiv ity, rather than be ing whim si cal.
Sec ond, let me sug gest that any non-dog matic em pir i cism must be lim ited in scope,
since it oth er wise pre cludes its ad vo cates from en gage ment with tran scen dent crit i cism 
of em pir i cism it self. When it co mes to dis cuss ing em pir i cism, the non-dog matic em -
pir i cist can not merely as sume that the only ad mis si ble ev i dence is ‘em pir i cal’, be cause 
this is ex actly one of the is sues that is, im plic itly or ex plic itly, to be dis cussed. But
what is more, she can not in fact just re fuse to ad mit any al leged ‘non-em pir i cal’ ev i -
dence into the dis cus sion, ei ther. In other words, it is not just what she be lieves, but
how she ac tu ally en gages in the dis cus sion, that is im por tant. She must have the crit i -
cal at ti tude.
What is the up shot of all this, with re spect to meta phys ics? The an swer is sim ple: to
criti cise it on the ba sis that it nec es sar ily in volves an un crit i cal ap proach, say with re -
spect to con tem po rary sci ence, is a straight for ward er ror. To criti cise it on the ba sis
that its pro po nents need un crit i cally as sume a par tic u lar view of the scope of ex pla na -
tion, or what counts as ev i dence, is also in cor rect. Unsurprisingly, meta phy si cians can
have crit i cal at ti tudes, and need not have ‘false con scious ness’ of the sort that Van
Fraassen as cribes to them. The God of the phi los o phers is nei ther alive nor dead, but
in a su per po si tion of states, un til we ex am ine it by crit i cal dis cus sion.
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